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(OSAPG). While the OSAPG has been hailed in some quarters as major institu-
tional reform of significant importance, there has been no focused academic
analysis of its mandate and work to date. This article addresses this gap and
is based on a series interviews conducted with prominent members of the OSAPG
itself and experts in the field of human rights. The article analyzes the differing
perspectives on the OSAPG and identifies the major institutional weaknesses,
methodological failings, and ongoing challenges facing the OSAPG as cited by
the interviewees. While there is clearly broad—though not universal—support for
the establishment of the OSAPG, there are a number of factors, both endogenous
and exogenous, which appear to have limited the influence of the OSAPG, and it
is not clear whether the office, as presently conceived, can realize the task it has
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Introduction
The Holocaust states have often committed themselves to preventing genocide, most
clearly through the 1948 Genocide Convention. Active support for the implementa-
tion of substantive reforms and initiatives aimed at achieving this goal, however,
has been less forthcoming. The refrain ‘‘Never Again!,’’ so often solemnly articulated
since the Holocaust, has often appeared as little more than an empty slogan when
contrasted with the glacial pace of reform and the international community’s erratic
response to instances of alleged and clear genocide in the modern era. There has
been, as Thomas Weiss noted, ‘‘a dramatic disconnect between political reality and
pious rhetoric.’’1
The establishment of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide (OSAPG) in 2004, however, constitutes a definite structural innovation
within the UN architecture specifically focused on helping to realize the ‘‘Never
Again!’’ promise. The OSAPG has been described as ‘‘pioneering new approaches to
genocide prevention that represent an important part of the intellectual history of
preventative diplomacy at the UN’’ and ‘‘an authentic basis for hope that the UN
may move gradually toward fulfillment of its potential.’’2 The OSAPG is, therefore,
of great importance not only for scholars working on genocide, but for all those
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concerned with the evolution of the UN and specifically its mechanisms for address-
ing intrastate humanitarian crises.
Despite this importance, to date there has been a dearth of academic inquiry into
the creation and role of the OSAPG, reflected in the paucity of references to the office
in academic literature. This article aims to help fill this gap in the literature by pro-
viding an analysis of perceptions of the OSAPG’s role to date and the barriers to its
efficacy, based on a series of face-to-face interviews conducted during the summer of
2009. The intention is twofold: first, to provide the first academic analysis of perspec-
tives on the OSAPG from practitioners and experts in the field of human rights, and
second, to analyze the OSPAG’s own perspective on its role and its response to the
criticisms leveled against it.
This article initially provides an overview of the establishment of the OSAPG
and the nature of the interviews conducted. There follows a conceptual analysis of
the OSAPG, assessing perceptions on both whether it normatively constitutes a
significant innovation and how it can best add value to the existing UN system. The
subsequent section focuses on empirical issues, namely, the profile of the OSAPG, its
relationship with the UN and specifically the Security Council, and the nature of
its work. The final section assesses the issues identified as constituting barriers to
the future success of the OSAPG.
Background to the OSAPG
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was the catalyst for a process of self-reflection
within the UN, which was derived from a general consensus that the UN system
had failed to respond in a timely and effective manner to this tragedy.3 The UN’s
inquiry into the genocide identified gaps in the early warning capacity of the organi-
zation and called for ‘‘an action plan to prevent genocide’’ aimed at ‘‘improving early
warning.’’4 This was re-emphasized by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a 2001
report when he advocated establishing a new office devoted to prevention.5 In April
2004, on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Kofi Annan launched his
‘‘Action Plan to Prevent Genocide,’’ which included the establishment of the OSAPG.
While this was certainly not the first time the UN had addressed the issue of
preventing genocide, the establishment of this office was unprecedented. David
Hamburg notes: ‘‘It was the first time any prevention professional had been
appointed at such a high level . . . [and] the first time that a unit focusing specifically
on genocide prevention had ever been created at the UN.’’6
The mandate of the OSAPG, contained in a letter from the secretary-general to
the Security Council on 12 July 2004, noted,
The Special Adviser will (a) collect existing information, in particular from within the
United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted,
might lead to genocide; (b) act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-
General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention
potential situations that could result in genocide; (c) make recommendations to the
Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt
genocide; (d) liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of
genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage
information relating to genocide or related crimes.7
Initially, Juan Mendez, an Argentinean human rights lawyer, was appointed Special
Adviser and the role was part-time. In May 2006, Kofi Annan established an
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Advisory Committee to support the work of the OSAPG. On 27 May 2007, Francis
Deng, former Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally
Displaced Persons, was appointed Special Adviser and, in August 2007, the OSAPG
was made a full-time position and the status of the Special Adviser was upgraded to
Under-Secretary-General.
Rather than rely on the few second-hand sources that deal only tangentially with
the OSAPG,8 or the OSAPG’s own reports, I conducted a series of interviews in
August 2009 to evaluate opinion as to the utility of the office.9 The aim of these
interviews was to gather information on the OSAPG both from those working within
the OSAPG and those outside the OSAPG who work on issues directly related to its
mandate. In the first category I interviewed Dr. Francis Deng, the Special Adviser;
Professor David Hamburg, Chairman of the OSAPG Advisory Committee; and Maria
Stavropoulou and Castro Wesamba, both Political Affairs Officers within the OSAPG.
In the second category I interviewed Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch’s United
Nations Advocacy Director; Heather Sonner from the International Secretariat of
the Institute for Global Policy; Sapna Chhatpar Considine, Project Manager with
the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect; Nicola Reindorp, Direc-
tor of Advocacy at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; and Professor
Thomas Weiss, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Science,
which is affiliated with the Central University of New York. The following analysis
reflects the perspectives of these interviewees and draws out generic themes related
to the OSAPG’s normative raison d’eˆtre, role to date, and future prospects.
Perspectives on the Concept of a Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide
There are very few people who, in principle, oppose preventing genocide. Broad
support for genocide prevention, of course, need not readily translate into support
for the creation of a particular UN office or indeed the OSAPG itself. There are
those, however, who argue that while genocide prevention is a nice idea, it is simply
not possible to predict the occurrence of genocide with any kind of accuracy.10 Others
argue that even the best genocide early warning system will be of little to no use as
the international community’s reaction to suspected or actual genocide is typically
too little, too late. While the horror of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 compelled
many to call for improved early warning systems and greater international engage-
ment in states evidencing signs of instability, many drew significantly different
conclusions. Given that the international community had brokered the Arusha
Accords—deemed by many to have been a catalyst in the eventual carnage11—and
also that there were many international observers, including the UN force UNAMIR,
in Rwanda prior to the outbreak of the violence, some have argued that the genocide
cannot be cited as evidence in support of the idea that early intervention and inter-
national engagement is necessarily a good thing.12
It is not the intention of this article to engage with this argument.13 Clearly,
those who are skeptical about early intervention and preventative diplomacy generally
will be unlikely to view the establishment of the OSAPG as a useful development. A
more illustrative means of gauging perceptions of the OSAPG’s utility is derived
from garnering the views of those who believe that preventative diplomacy and
international engagement generally are, in principle, good ideas, hence the choice of
interviewees outside the OSAPG itself.
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Heather Sonner, from the International Secretariat of the Institute for Global
Policy, noted that her organization wishes to have ‘‘a very collaborative relationship
with the Special Advisor’s office . . . we very much want to support the mandate and
what they do.’’ Sonner argued that the secretary-general was tasked with maintain-
ing a generally cordial relationship with all member states. The Special Adviser,
however, would have the freedom to ‘‘speak out on such a sensitive issue as genocide
and . . . sound the alarm.’’14 This view was echoed by Steve Crawshaw from Human
Rights Watch, who identified ‘‘the wakeup call potential’’ of the OSAPG as being
‘‘very important.’’15 Similarly Nicola Reindorp, Director of Advocacy at the Global
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, stated, ‘‘Has [the OSAPG] got an impor-
tant and valuable role and has the original concept behind it still got value?
Absolutely.’’16 A key aspect of the ‘‘valuable role’’ of the OSAPG, according to
Reindorp, was that it would, ‘‘make it more politically costly for any policy maker to
fail . . . to take action in a particular way,’’ and that the existence of the office meant
‘‘[there are] people responsible to ensure that parts of the [UN] bureaucracy are
watching for warning signs and driving discussion around policy options.’’17
The OSAPG does not have a significant presence on the ground in trouble spots
around the world, nor has it established a new means of gathering information.
Rather, it aims to ‘‘filter information.’’18 Yet analyses of the genocide in Rwanda
in 1994 have noted that the most outrageous aspect of the UN response was the
fact that information was readily available and alarm bells were sounded, most
infamously Romeo Dallaire’s cable on 11 January 1994 warning that he had
uncovered plans for mass murder and had information about the location of weapons
caches.19 Establishing an office to manage information about impending genocide
may thus be seen as a solution to a problem that has not really been of major import,
certainly when compared to the problem of mobilizing political will among the five
permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) to take timely and effective
action. Crawshaw argued, however, that ‘‘[in 1994] there wasn’t a lack of information
but there was a lack of those who had information, who were able to cut like a knife
through the system.’’20 The OSAPG, he suggested, had the potential to serve as this
fast track. On this issue Sonner noted that while there were certain offices within
the UN that were already charged with dealing with gathering information related
to the prevention of genocide—in particular the High Commissioner for Human
Rights—there was no single spokesperson mandated specifically to focus on genocide
prevention and thus the OSAPG brought a sharper focus to the issue. Sonner argued
that the OSAPG would be able to ‘‘prevent the hyper politicisation of that informa-
tion as it moves up the chain within the Secretariat, which we did see in the case of
Rwanda.’’21 Reindorp claimed that it would be a ‘‘real exaggeration to suggest that
the appointment of one person and a couple of people is going to revolutionize the
response to genocide.’’ Nonetheless, this attempt ‘‘to plug one little piece of the gap
in the capacity of the UN secretariat, which itself is one tiny, tiny piece in the whole
prevention of genocide architecture’’ was, she claimed, ‘‘significant,’’ though the
OSAPG should not be seen as ‘‘a kind of a panacea.’’22
Within the OSAPG, the question of the office’s added value was accepted as
being ‘‘a valid concern.’’23 Francis Deng acknowledged that there was a plethora of
sources of information and that the OSAPG was not going to add significantly to
the detection of warning signs and did not constitute ‘‘anything dramatically
new.’’24 Nonetheless, he argued that the significance of the OSAPG derived from
the fact that, unlike NGOs, ‘‘[the OSAPG is a] UN entity, which was agreed upon
as a result of collective thinking about what the UN should be doing to respond to
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this issue. [It is] a spotlight within the system which is well equipped and capaci-
tated, it can mobilise these resources.’’25 Deng recalled that prior to the Rwandan
genocide, Bacre Ndiaye, then UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
Arbitrary Executions, wrote a report that he submitted to the UN warning about the
likelihood of massive violence in Rwanda. This report, Deng noted, was lost in
the UN bureaucracy.26 Deng claimed, ‘‘If Ndiaye’s report had come to a focal point
within the UN system that was charged to make use of such information, to rally
forces, to alert the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council, that perhaps
would have been more effective.’’27 The OSAPG was evidently now acting as this
‘‘ focal point with the UN system’’ and thus ostensibly constituted a significant
reform of the existing system. Likewise Maria Stavropoulou, Political Affairs Officer
within the OSAPG, argued that the very existence of the OSPAG meant that if
action was not taken and genocide occurred, the OSAPG would be able to apportion
blame.28
This broad support for the establishment of the OSAPG and endorsement of its
utility was not shared by all. Professor Thomas Weiss asserted, ‘‘ [I]it’s not a real job,
it’s not something you can really do anything about from the inside at this point in
time . . . I think it would make much more sense to keep this as a focus or a part
of the High Commission for Human Rights and keep it live, but not expect it to
go anywhere because I don’t think it will.’’29 Weiss noted that this was a view
shared by Gareth Evans, who expressed similar concerns at a meeting of the OSAPG
Advisory Committee.30 In response to Evans’s criticism of the OSAPG, Weiss
claimed, ‘‘[David] Hamburg went through the ceiling, Francis [Deng] went through
the ceiling but I actually think that they just don’t want to hear how few clothes
the emperor has.’’31 Additionally, while the representatives of the NGOs interviewed
were broadly supportive of the office’s raison d’eˆtre, they all expressed significant
concerns about the methods of the Special Adviser. These concerns, explored in the
next section, suggested that the OSAPG’s potential utility had not been achieved,
rendering the office largely impotent.
Assessing the Role of the OSAPG to Date
The OSAPG has yet to achieve a high profile; according to Sonner, ‘‘there is still
a significant challenge in making people aware that the office exists.’’32 It has
attracted very little attention within academia, and even within the UN system, it
has been overlooked at times. Stavropoulou noted that the OSAPG was not invited
to a meeting of a UN inter-agency framework team for conflict prevention. She
recalled, ‘‘The office had to take the initiative to say, ‘We would like to be part of
this.’ This happened not just with this framework but within a couple of other fora
as well. There was no objection, nobody said, ‘We don’t think you should be part of
that meeting,’ there was never any objection but also there was no automaticity.’’33
It is significant that an office charged with such an important mandate established
over five years ago would be overlooked in this way and it is indicative of the
OSAPG’s low profile.
To some extent, the OSAPG’s low profile derives from the initial status of the
office. David Hamburg noted that prior to his appointment as Special Adviser, Juan
Mendez had accepted a full-time position as a president of the International Centre
for Transitional Justice. According to Hamburg, while Kofi Annan appointed Mendez
in the belief that he would work full-time, Mendez believed the position was part-
time, involving ‘‘at the most, a day a week.’’ Hamburg recalled, ‘‘Well then, we
had to make the best of it. We didn’t want to embarrass Kofi, we didn’t want to
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embarrass Mendez, and so we decided, ‘Well, let’s say we’re going to start very small
and experimentally.’ ’’34 This confusion, and the initial part-time nature of the
role during Mendez’s tenure, understandably influenced the OSAPG’s productivity.
When Mendez stepped down and was replaced by Deng, the position was quickly
made full-time, although, according to Hamburg, ‘‘[The UN] budget committee gave
[Deng] nothing,’’ with the result that Deng had to make do with a skeletal staff for
the first year of his tenure.35 Deng acknowledged that he spent most of his initial
twelve months trying to generate funding and recruit staff rather than actively work-
ing to fulfill his mandate.36
In addition to this issue of capacity, a number of other explanations were cited as
reasons for the OSAPG’s low profile. Stavropoulou noted that ‘‘because of its type of
mandate and the type of work it does, [the OSAPG] cannot be a very ‘productive’
office. We do not put notes and reports on our website like others; we simply can’t.
Politically it’s impossible.’’ Additionally, she suggested that within the UN, ‘‘there is
a bit of a proliferation of separate offices, entities, units, and so forth, and not all are
well known.’’37 This is certainly true; nevertheless, it is curious that an office that
is tasked with addressing such an emotive issue, which resonates so widely and
attracts so much attention, should be so anonymous.38
All those interviewed not directly connected to the OSAPG identified Deng’s style
as a key factor in the failure of the OSAPG to achieve prominence. Weiss noted that
the few press statements realized by the OSAPG had been largely devoid of signifi-
cant content and asserted, ‘‘I think Juan Mendez did more in 5% of his time than
Francis does in 100% of his.’’ Weiss claimed that Deng had ‘‘moved very quickly
into becoming a UN bureaucrat,’’ suggesting he had decided to maintain cordial rela-
tions with key actors in the UN and the major states. Deng’s previous trail-blazing
work on internally displaced, Weiss argued, was a function of his position at the
time as a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, which gave him more freedom.
Regarding Deng’s new role, Weiss stated, ‘‘He’s in a real comfort zone; the secretary-
general’s not pushing him to do more, his [Advisory] Committee isn’t pushing him to
do more, states would just as soon [prefer] he’d keep quiet.’’ Weiss claimed that the
current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon ‘‘doesn’t want any noise or any waves,’’
while ‘‘Francis [Deng] doesn’t want anybody to be angry at him any of the time.’’ The
combination of these approaches meant ‘‘[the OSAPG] is so behind the scenes that
it’s invisible.’’39
Sonner agreed that there were many within the NGO community who called for
Deng to have a much more public profile. She argued that more should have been
done to date in terms of public diplomacy and claimed that the OSAPG needed to
engage in a ‘‘substantial amount of outreach.’’40 Reindorp acknowledged that the
OSAPG had suffered from a lack of resources, and while she accepted that Deng’s
preference was for quiet diplomacy, she argued that ‘‘there hasn’t been as much
dynamism in the office, even in doing that.’’41
Deng acknowledged that he is committed to a ‘‘quiet approach’’ and observed
that, ‘‘obviously, you don’t see the results of the quiet approach as much.’’42 Accept-
ing that there were many within the NGO community who disagreed with his
approach, Deng defended his style by claiming it had proved its effectiveness during
his time as representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally
Displaced Persons. He claimed that, ‘‘if I were to be seen as crying out loud, naming
and shaming, talking about such a sensitive issue . . . I would not be invited by coun-
tries, doors would be closed, and I don’t see how I can help people if I cannot even go
and see the country and engage the governments in a constructive dialogue.’’43 Deng
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further argued that the results of his efforts were effectively doomed to invisibility
for two reasons: First, successful preventative action necessarily stops something
becoming a major issue and thus is less likely to attract attention. Second, behind-
the-scenes diplomacy is by definition conducted in private and cannot be publicized
if it is effective. Continuing, Deng noted, ‘‘The British ambassador was telling me
just the other day, ‘You have really made an impact by approaching your mandate
in a non-threatening way,’ but that is not visible to people. Nobody’s going to speak
about it unless you go round and perhaps question member states about what they
think about the work we’re doing.’’44 There is clearly a degree of logic to Deng’s
defense of his methods. Nonetheless, when I asked Deng and his staff to identify
where the OSAPG had had the greatest positive impact, which may not have been
apparent to outsiders, their responses were evasive.45
The manner in which Deng has chosen to pursue his mandate is clearly of some
concern. This is made all the more significant by virtue of the fact that there was
general consensus that the potential utility of this office was, almost uniquely, a
function of the Special Adviser’s capacity to speak out. Crawshaw argued that the
OSAPG had to be outspoken to have any real effect and stated, ‘‘Once you’ve got
that job title on your business card, you have to accept that is the job title on your
business card and not everybody’s going to like you. So you can stop thinking that
you can be everybody’s best friend. You won’t be and that’s impossible. . . . Yes, it’s a
post which requires diplomacy in many contexts, but it also requires very robust
speaking.’’46 Sonner noted that her organization initially supported the OSAPG
because they believed the office would be ‘‘making the tough calls and really putting
the pressure on member states to take action in situations that look like they’re
moving towards genocide,’’ and thus they were disenchanted with Deng’s approach.47
Reindorp asserted that the OSAPG had to do more than exclusively engage in
behind-the-scenes work; she noted, ‘‘Have you got the person in the position that
is best able to juggle the challenges between being the whistle-blower and being
the advocate with governments? I don’t think so.’’48 Staff at the OSAPG, perhaps
unsurprisingly, rejected this assertion; Stavropoulou argued, ‘‘a public statement
can shut that many more doors in the short term, and in the long term make the
mandate less effective, and I think NGOs don’t always realize that.’’49 NGOs, she
claimed, tend to evaluate activity on the basis of the number of statements an office
had made, and in the case of the OSAPG, this approach overlooked much of its work.
Deng and his staff were also keen to highlight the fact that their capacity to
make public statements was dependent on the assent of the secretary-general.
Stavropoulou recalled that there were times when the Special Adviser had wanted
to speak out, but ‘‘it wasn’t always possible’’ because of opposition from the secretary-
general.50 Deng similarly stated,
Another very important thing that people miss is I am an arm of the secretary-
general and everything I do, even when I want to make a statement or a press release
or an op-ed, has to be cleared with the office of the secretary-general and very often,
in fact on two or three occasions, they advised me against saying anything . . . on the
Sudan, on Sri Lanka, on Myanmar. I think people miss this when they think I have
my own autonomous standing . . . I’m not an independent voice of humanity; I am a
tool of the secretary-general.51
While this subservience to the secretary-general, himself widely considered overly
cautious, appears to support Weiss’s view on the impact of Deng’s personality, Castro
Wesamba, Political Affairs Officer within the OSAPG, argued that the OSAPG did
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not acquiesce with the secretary-general’s caution in every instance, and noted that
there were occasions when ‘‘we have really come out very strongly within the UN
system and said, ‘There’s no way the Special Adviser’s going to keep quiet about
this.’ ’’52 Despite this apparent unwillingness to tow the line in every case, it is
difficult to identify anything controversial or even strongly-worded in any of the
statements released by the OSAPG. It seems clear that the combination of a very
cautious secretary-general and a Special Adviser, who by nature seeks to maintain
cordial relations with everyone, has had an impact on the public profile of the
OSAPG.
While the relatively low profile of the OSAPG was overwhelmingly attributed to
the approach taken by Deng, Sonner did highlight another possible explanation. She
speculated that Deng’s caution had much to do with the fact that his predecessor
had once been embarrassingly barred from addressing the Security Council.53 This
incident occurred on 10 October 2005 when, according to Hamburg, the then US
Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, literally marshaled Mendez out of the room
before a meeting of the Council.54 Clearly this public denigration of the OSAPG did
little to enhance its status and, as Sonner suggests, there appears to be evidence
that Deng was influenced by this incident. He stated that ‘‘my approach, which
some NGOs were uneasy with, is not to press [the Security Council]. When I came
on board I said, ‘Look, if I come out loudly knocking at the door and the door is
closed, what good is it? I’m just going to create tension between my office and the
Security Council.’ ’’55 Deng has certainly not formally engaged with the Security
Council as much as many would like, with Weiss and Sonner particularly critical of
his reluctance to do so. Crawshaw observed that Mendez had been highly critical
of the Security Council’s ability, and evident willingness, to block the Special Adviser
from addressing meetings of the Council.56 In his final report as Special Adviser,
Mendez advised that the mandate of the OSAPG be strengthened to ensure that the
right to address the Council be clarified. This amendment to the mandate has not
occurred.57
This capacity to address the Council has been cited as one of the OSAPG’s most
significant powers.58 The reluctance on the part of members of the Security Council,
both permanent and non-permanent, to allow the Special Adviser access clearly under-
mines the potential of this aspect of the OSAPG’s mandate, and thus, in practice,
the mandate of the OSAPG is not a mechanism that ensures warnings are always
conveyed to the Security Council.59 Nonetheless the potential for the Special Adviser
to address the Security Council is cited by OSAPG staff as ‘‘a major achievement
in itself,’’ which differentiates the OSAPG from NGOs and other UN bodies.60
Stavropoulou argued that while Deng had not pushed to exercise this privilege,
‘‘there are different ways of engaging the Security Council. It doesn’t have to be
through the submission of a report in a formal way or through a formal hearing.
It can be through informal contacts with the members, informal contact with the
President. There are many different ways of communicating in a fashion that won’t
be threatening and therefore will result in rejection.’’61 Deng, indeed, suggested that
formally addressing the Council was of limited utility. He stated, ‘‘Every time an
issue is brought to the Security Council, you can predict . . . how Russia, China, and
the others will vote. This is another consideration when it comes to my relationship
with the Security Council; if you go there and say, ‘I am here concerned about what’s
happening in this or that country,’ not only are you raising the stakes but you’re
also generating controversy because you are going to get one member or another
of the P5 to defend that country.’’62 In addition to this question about the utility of
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addressing the Council, there is the issue of the novelty of this provision. It is indeed
true that there are few offices within the UN, and fewer outside it, that can address
the Council directly. Yet, it is not the case that without this privilege the perspec-
tives of certain groups can never be heard at Council meetings. Under Article 99 of
the Charter, the secretary-general can automatically address the Council; while this
provision is rarely used, it is conceivable that the secretary-general may bring details
of a report by a particular UN office or even an NGO to the Council’s attention.
In this sense, the capacity of the OSAPG to present to the Council may not be as
significant as it first appears. I put this to the staff at the OSAPG; Wesamba replied,
‘‘Okay, yes, [a report by an NGO] can be raised. The secretary-general can brief the
Security Council directly about Situation X, of which the information has come from
the Red Cross or some other NGO.’’ He added, however, that a report from the
OSAPG would be different because ‘‘it creates responsibilities . . . I think it creates
expectations and that’s the difference.’’ Given that the Council had agreed to the
establishment of the OSAPG, he argued, a briefing by the Special Adviser ‘‘creates
obligations.’’63
The fact that the Security Council has been less than enthusiastic about hearing
reports from the OSAPG is not altogether surprising. What was perhaps more sur-
prising was that OSAPG staff, including the Special Adviser himself, claimed that
there was opposition to the OSAPG from within the UN bureaucracy itself. Deng
asserted that there were a number of times when he sought to have an input into
the UN’s response to a certain intrastate situation and ‘‘the first line of resistance
was from our own people.’’ Deng stated that as his office did not have independent
information-gathering capacity, the OSAPG was reliant on other offices within the
UN to provide them with information. He noted, however, that ‘‘there are entities,
even within the UN, that consider this type of information confidential and they are
guarding their own interests . . . We are supposed to get the information from within
the UN, primarily from within the UN. Yet we get more information from outside
the UN because NGOs are willing, and scholars are willing to give us what they
know. The system itself is not that collaborative.’’64 Deng specifically cited the cases
of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008 and Sri Lanka in 2009 as instances
when his involvement was greeted with hostility from within the UN system. Deng
recalled that he became particularly frustrated when his involvement in Sri Lanka
was questioned and he told a meeting of the secretary-general and his senior staff,
‘‘You say that the office has no say? When will it ever be in a position to say
anything about any country?’’65 Both Deng and his staff stated that their presence
at UN meetings on a particular country situation invariably led to raised eyebrows
as other offices assumed that the OSAPG would concern itself only with instances of
genocide.66 In fact, the opposite is the case; the OSAPG, as one might indeed guess
from the title, is concerned with preventing genocide rather than identifying it. In
fact, the Special Adviser is not mandated to decree that genocide is taking place.
While it may at first seem curious that the UN system itself has proved to be
reluctant to engage with the OSAPG, and has at times evidently been hostile toward
it, this may be more comprehensible when one assesses the nature of bureaucracies
in general. Michael Barnett’s highly critical analysis of the UN’s response to the
Rwandan genocide is notable for his claim that, while the UN’s response was
unquestionably deeply flawed, it was, ‘‘grounded in ethical considerations.’’67 Clearly
these considerations did not privilege the suffering Tutsis, and thus the basis for
the ethical considerations that informed the decision to react to the genocide in
such a manner must be found elsewhere. Barnett argues that the UN, like all
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bureaucracies, has developed ‘‘a discourse and formal and informal rules that shape
what individuals care about and the practices they view as appropriate, desirable,
and ethical in their own right.’’68 Thus, in 1994 the priority, perversely, within the
UN was not the plight of the Tutsis, but rather ‘‘the health of the UN.’’69 The growth
and suffocating pervasiveness of the bureaucratic ethical code creates a situation
where those charged with serving certain individuals and groups outside the organi-
zation actually de-prioritize this formal role in favor of a determination to preserve
the integrity of the system. Hence, the establishment of the OSAPG can be seen
as constituting a challenge to the status quo within the UN bureaucracy, and it
is, therefore, entirely predictable that those people long socialized into the UN
bureaucratic mindset and its insular priorities would seek to protect the status quo
and undermine and isolate the OSAPG. Of course, this hostility to the OSAPG, and
indeed any ostensible challenge to the status quo and prevailing bureaucratic
culture, will dissipate if the OSAPG itself internalizes the dominant cultural norms
and ethical priorities. As explored later in this article, there is evidence to suggest
that the OSAPG has already sought to integrate with the existing system rather
than act as a challenge to it. Indeed, according to Thomas Weiss, ‘‘[Deng has] moved
very quickly into becoming a UN bureaucrat, ‘recognizing all the constraints that
exist,’ blah, blah, blah, and he is no longer on the outside.’’70
The misperception about the OSAPG’s mandate has had an impact on its rela-
tions with states as well as other UN offices. It is perhaps understandable that
states will be somewhat resistant to engaging with ‘‘The Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide’’ given the negative implications that will invariably arise.
Indeed, Weiss remarked, ‘‘If you were coming to my country and you said, ‘I’m the
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,’ the idea that I would welcome you with
open arms is clearly not a solid place to start.’’71 Stavropoulou also admitted, ‘‘The
closer we get to a country, the more difficult it becomes for apparent reasons.’’72
Paragraph 140 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document commits all states to
‘‘fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide,’’ although whether this is honored in practice is open to
debate. This lack of cooperation appeared to have been evident in late 2008 when a
visit to Burundi was canceled when the government claimed to be unable to provide
an official to meet the Special Adviser.73 Wesamba, however, claimed that ‘‘there’s
not any substantive evidence that states don’t like to engage with the Special
Adviser’’ and argued that the case of Burundi was an exception.74 Since the estab-
lishment of the OSAPG, the situation in Darfur has arguably been the most serious
intrastate crises of a potentially genocidal nature. On 19 September 2005, the then
Special Adviser Juan Mendez visited Sudan and noted in his report, ‘‘The govern-
ment of Sudan extended its cooperation to me during the course of the visit.’’75 This
suggests that even certain states widely denounced as engaging in genocide appear
willing to engage with the OSAPG, or perhaps, it suggests only that the OSAPG
has acquired a status that precludes states from being seen to actively ignore it.
Deng noted that his work was also hampered by a reluctance among certain
powerful states to engage with the OSAPG, claiming, ‘‘those who would be called
upon to intervene to stop [genocide], tend to be resistant to discussing this issue.’’76
Many such states are keen to play down the scale of crises and feel that the
OSAPG’s presence would attract attention and create a momentum in favor of
action. Deng recalled that it had been suggested that his title be changed to ‘‘Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities’’77 and also that he be
made a ‘‘Representative’’ rather than a ‘‘Special Adviser.’’ This was rejected, Deng
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maintained, by Russia, which led a campaign and mobilized many other countries to
oppose any expansion of the OSAPG’s mandate or further upgrade in its status. This,
he argued, was because Russia feared that this would lead to rebel groups achieving
disproportionate publicity for their cause and the creation of more pressure for some
response from the Security Council. Nonetheless, while his mandate has not formally
been expanded and there remains significant support among states for him to
concern himself only with genocide, Deng stated, ‘‘I see my mandate in a broader
sense . . . I am not focusing on the legalistic definition of genocide and nor am I
guided only by that narrow definition.’’78
‘‘A Waste of Time, and Energy, and Money’’?
Those directly connected with the OSAPG argued that it was too early to form an
accurate appraisal of the office. They argued that it had really only been active since
early 2008, as previously the part-time nature of the job, the lack of resources, and
the minimal staff had hampered its effectiveness. Nonetheless, it was clear from the
interviews with those outside the OSAPG that strong opinions as to the utility of the
OSAPG had already been formed.
In his summation, Weiss asserted, ‘‘Frankly, I think this office is a waste of time,
and energy and money.’’ Evidence that the OSPAG has achieved any results is,
according to Weiss, ‘‘totally lacking.’’79 As noted previously, much of the blame for
this has been attributed to the personality and style of Deng. While everyone inter-
viewed spoke highly of Deng’s intellect, character, and experience, all those not
working directly with the OSAPG were critical of his appointment on the basis that
his ‘‘behind-the-scenes’’ approach was ill-suited to this role.80 In assessing this ques-
tion it is necessary to reiterate the fact that preventative diplomacy by definition
does not produce spectacular results. As Payam Akhavan notes ‘‘The Special Adviser
has a thankless job. His success in early warning and prevention is necessarily
measured in terms of what does not happen.’’81 Additionally, the OSAPG’s mandate
commits it to act ‘‘without excessive publicity’’ and, therefore, while NGO’s and
others may believe that the OSAPG should act as an alarm bell, this is not actually
its official remit.82
It seems, however, that the utility of this ‘‘early warning’’ mechanism should be
to act as the ‘‘alarm call’’ that many interviewees suggested. Behind-the-scenes
diplomacy is not in itself inherently ineffective and clearly there is a place for just
such a style. Yet, arguably, the UN secretary-general and the Red Cross already
fulfill this role, and it does not seem logical to adopt this approach for this particular
office. The office has not improved the information-gathering capacity of the UN and
hence its utility lies in its capacity, as Crawshaw argued, to fast track information
from other sources through the UN system.83 This would be most effectively done
in a public way, meaning the Special Adviser would formally submit reports, give
presentations, produce statements, etc., to maximize the impact of any particularly
worrying information. If the information handled by the OSAPG is quietly and
unofficially disseminated, this then has an impact on its capacity to create a momen-
tum in favor of action. Deng acknowledged that states involved in activities deemed
to be potentially genocidal, or likely to lead to genocide, are uncomfortable with dis-
cussing their situation in public for fear of external intervention. He additionally
noted that states with either the capacity to intervene or the mandate to take
action—or both in the case of the P5—are also happy to bury bad news for fear
that they will be called upon to take action. How then, will Deng’s ‘‘quiet approach’’
convince either the state involved in the deteriorating situation, or those states most
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010
268
likely to be called upon to respond, to take action to prevent an explosion of violence?
None of the reports about the Rwandan genocide concluded that effective action
would have occurred if the dire warnings issued before the genocide, by Ndiaye and
Dallaire, for example, had been relayed through the UN system in a ‘‘quiet’’ manner.
Indeed, by late April 1994, some three weeks after the Rwandan genocide began,
representatives of the Czech Republic, Spain, New Zealand, and Argentina pressed
the Secretariat to make public the information it had. The failure of the Secretariat
to do so convinced these countries to look beyond the Secretariat for information and
the information they eventually received convinced them that genocide was occurring
and they publically called for more robust action, thereby significantly increasing the
pressure on the P5 to act. As Nicolas Wheeler notes, the eventual public clamor to
do something, particularly in France, eventually led to action being taken, albeit
disastrously late and possibly in a counter-productive manner.84 To discuss deterio-
rating situations—so grave that they bear the hallmarks of potential genocide—
informally with a view to maintaining cordiality cannot by definition generate a
momentum in favor of action. Behind-the-scenes informal briefings leave no paper
trail and thus facilitate the excuse, often offered after a crisis, that ‘‘we didn’t know
how bad things were.’’85
Of course, generating momentum does not guarantee effective or timely action;
the campaign to take robust action in Darfur was a huge success in terms of mobiliz-
ing international opinion and forcing the issue onto the agenda of the Security Council
and yet it is now routinely argued that action taken in response to this campaign
was manifestly inadequate.86 This has obvious implications for the approach adopted
by Deng; if a massive campaign in favor of international action can fail to convince
states to act then it seems fair to conclude that a ‘‘quiet approach’’ will be less likely
to succeed. As Weiss remarked, ‘‘Logically speaking, if you can’t even get people
mobilized to do something in the midst of a crisis, the idea that somehow even before
you have a crisis, they’re all going to align and put money on it seems to me to be
against the nature of human beings and certainly against the nature of the inter-
state system.’’87 Of course, there are notable examples of effective international pre-
ventative action such as the UN Preventative Deployment Force stationed on the
Macedonian/Serbian border from 1992 to 1999. Yet the history of the international
response to intra-state crises undoubtedly suggests a reactive disposition despite
the fact that proactive preventative action is not only likely to save lives, but is also
significantly cheaper than action taken once violence has erupted.88
Deng, however, argued that while his methods were decried by NGOs, they had
proven their effectiveness during his time as Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. Yet Weiss claimed that much
of Deng’s undoubted success in his previous role was a function of his semi-
independence from the UN bureaucracy, as he was also an academic at the time.89
Deng himself acknowledged that while working on internally displaced persons,
there were times when he exploited the freedom of his academic position to take
certain actions that would have been impossible for a UN bureaucrat.90 Given that
Deng no longer has the second hat as an academic, he cannot rely on the counter-
tactic to the quiet approach he feels being a UN official requires him to adopt.
In any event, Deng and his staff argued that the OSAPG had exercised significant
influence at certain times, though this was necessarily largely impossible to see
given that the work was done behind-the-scenes, and by definition it produces results
you do not see. Nonetheless, none of those working with the OSAPG identified a
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particular case as an example of the OSAPG’s effectiveness, and it is difficult not to
conclude that this is indicative of the OSAPG’s modest influence.
Yet, there is arguably a bigger concern regarding the efficacy of the OSAPG; the
utility of the office is premised not on a belief in the benevolence of statesmen, but
rather on an assumption that they fear shame. Stavropoulou claimed that a formal
report by the OSAPG becomes part of the public record and serves as a deterrent to
inaction as there will be a permanent record of the Special Adviser’s warnings. She
noted, ‘‘If, God forbid, another Rwanda happens and if this office has done its
job properly, then it must have been able to identify what was going on, what was
coming . . . It will have brought this to the attention of the secretary-general and the
Security Council and if no action is taken, then the responsibility and the account-
ability is very precisely located.’’91 Similarly, Wesamba argued that a report from
the OSAPG created ‘‘obligations.’’ When pressed to identify what these ‘‘obligations’’
were, given that there is no mention of any obligation incumbent upon the Security
Council to even listen to the Special Adviser let alone act on his recommendations,
Wesamba argued that these were obligations in the sense that they created norma-
tive pressure rather than legal compulsions to act.92 Deng himself argued, ‘‘ [By
establishing the OSAPG] we are sharpening our sensitivity to these issues and the
resolve of the international community to act. Every time we say ‘Never again!’ and
it happens again, the level of guilt rises and as the level of guilt rises, the level
of resolve to do something about it before the next time increases.’’93 Given recent
history, this would appear to be a perspective born more from hope than experience.
After the genocide in Rwanda, statesmen around the world lamented their response
and ‘‘Never Again!’’ was once again widely and loudly proclaimed. Yet, in his assess-
ment of the response to the crisis in Darfur, Kofi Annan noted, ‘‘We were slow,
hesitant, uncaring and we had learnt nothing from Rwanda.’’94 This clearly doesn’t
correlate with Deng’s claim. States appear to have little compunction about ignoring
or equivocating about a looming or actual genocide unless they have significant
national interests involved. National interests are not immutable, of course, and
there is some evidence that pressure to act, either from NGOs, domestic publics or
UN organs, can influence states to alter their stance on a particular issue. None-
theless, it seems unlikely that an office that the Security Council is empowered to
ignore, led by a Special Adviser who has chosen to adopt a ‘‘quiet approach’’ and
restrained from speaking out by a cautious secretary-general, will be able to generate
the requisite pressure to convince those states with the power and authority to
mandate preventative action to fundamentally alter their foreign policies.
Conclusion
The UN internal inquiry into the organization’s response in 1994 presented fourteen
recommendations for UN reform, the fourth of which stated, ‘‘The early warning
capacity of the United Nations needs to be improved though better cooperation with
outside actors including NGOs and academics as well as within the Secretariat.’’95
The OSAPG appears to be a tangible manifestation of this recommendation and on
that basis its establishment is to be welcomed. It has been championed by both the
current and former secretary-general as a highly significant innovation and the
importance of its mandate is obvious. To date, however, it has not been subjected
to focused academic analysis and information about the working of the office and
perceptions as to its effectiveness are largely absent from academic literature. This
article has sought to address this gap and is based on a unique series of interviews
with leading figures within the OSAPG and informed observers outside it. The
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findings of this research are illustrative of the views of NGOs and the OSAPG itself.
It would be additionally instructive to undertake research into the perspectives of
various nations on the OSAPG and, though this is beyond the scope of the current
article, it is a future aim.
Deng recalled that when he was asked to take up the position of Special Adviser
he felt it was ‘‘a call of duty and a service to humanity that I could not take lightly,’’
though he admitted, ‘‘I quickly went from being flattered and honored, to worrying
‘what have I got myself into in taking on this huge responsibility?’ ’’96 Deng and his
staff ’s commitment to the OSAPG appears to be beyond question and their genuine
enthusiasm for the OSAPG can only be beneficial. This enthusiasm, however, is not
widely shared.
The ‘‘quiet approach’’ adopted by Deng does have some support and should not
be disregarded as fundamentally flawed.97 Nonetheless, while behind-the-scenes
diplomacy can be effective, it is criticized as an inappropriate method for this office.
All those interviewed working outside the OSAPG argued that the Special Adviser
should become a much more public figure and act as a vocal warning mechanism.
Yet, given the nature of the mandate, a compromise between Deng’s approach and
that advocated by the interviewees would arguably be best advised. Without becom-
ing a media-friendly mouthpiece, the Special Adviser could maintain a demeanor of
calm analysis, rather than adopting a combative, accusatory approach based on a
worse-case-scenario reading of information. He could increase the profile of the
OSAPG by seeking to exploit its capacity to address the Security Council. Failure to
avail himself of this aspect of the mandate constitutes a lost opportunity to raise
the profile of the OSAPG, but more importantly, engaging more formally with the
Council creates a formal record of warnings issued to the P5, which could undermine
any subsequent claims that information about a particular situation was lacking.
This is not to support the claims made by Stavropoulou that the OSAPG could
somehow ‘‘shame’’ the P5 into acting, but it does constitute the basis for generating
some degree of leverage; action of this type by the OSAPG will be highly unlikely
in and of itself to convince the Security Council to take preventative action, but in
conjunction with other factors, it could contribute to building momentum. Acting
more in the public sphere would additionally raise the profile of the OSAPG within
the UN itself, where it is clear there is a lack of information about the office. Many of
those who do know of its existence, evidently harbor a degree of hostility toward it.
The central issue in the quest to prevent genocide is the mobilization of political
will. The UN’s inquiry into the Rwandan genocide claimed that the ‘‘fundamental
failure’’ was ‘‘a persistent lack of political will.’’98 Overcoming this barrier consti-
tutes an enormous task that should not be deemed the responsibility of the OSPAG
alone. The interviews conducted with staff at the OSAPG highlighted that states are
reluctant to discuss genocide—actual or apprehended—for fear that they may be
called upon to act. Clearly this disposition among states creates a far from propitious
context in which the OSAPG is tasked with executing its mandate. The fact that
the Special Adviser cannot automatically address the Security Council is perhaps
indicative of the P5’s desire to manage the flow of information it is formally exposed
to. The former Special Adviser—Juan Mendez—suggested reforming the mandate of
the OSAPG so that the right to address the Council could not be vetoed and this
would be a potentially highly significant strengthening of the OSAPG’s powers. Yet,
even with this reform of the OSAPG’s mandate, there is no guarantee that the
spectacle of inertia in the face of mass tragedy, which has so degraded the status of
the UN in the past, will not happen again. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon noted
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in his 2009 report, ‘‘[T]he crucial element in the prevention of genocide remains
responding to concerns, once these have been communicated.’’99 The current secretary-
general has expressed his commitment to the office and there appears to be no danger
that it will be dissolved in the near future. Whether the OSAPG can ever be effective
given its restrictive mandate, the style of the current incumbent, and the perennial
problem posed by the lack of political will, especially amongst the P5, will become
more evident in the next five years as crises inevitably arise and the OSAPG’s
influence—or lack thereof—becomes more evident.
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